
All Party Parliamentary Group on
Artificial Intelligence

AI WITHOUT BORDERS

NAVIGATING AI GEOPOLITICS & BUILDING THE UK'S GLOBAL AI LEADERSHIP



BIG INNOVATION CENTRE

September 2026
Policy Forum

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BIG INNOVATION CENTRE

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All Party Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence

Rapporteur's Preface

What does it mean for the UK to be a global leader in artificial intelligence? Is leadership defined by technological independence and control over critical infrastructure, or by the ability to apply AI effectively, establish trusted standards and shape international cooperation?

These questions were at the heart of the APPG on Artificial Intelligence's evidence meeting, AI Without Borders, held in the UK Parliament on 14 September 2026.

The meeting revealed strikingly different perspectives on the strategic direction the UK should take, reflecting wider debates about technological sovereignty, economic competitiveness, democratic governance and national security.

Dr Cecilia Rikap (University College London) challenged the concentration of economic, technological and political power among major US technology companies. She argued that the UK must reduce structural dependencies and strengthen democratic control over the development and governance of AI.

Rhian Woods (OC&C Strategy Consultants) offered a different perspective on UK competitiveness. She argued that Britain need not lead every technological frontier. Instead, its strengths lie in its knowledge-intensive economy, professional expertise and ability to translate AI into commercial and societal value.
Anthony (Tony) Reeves (Deloitte) questioned whether technological sovereignty can be achieved simply by developing domestic AI models. Genuine independence, he argued, must be considered across the entire AI stack, including compute, energy, data, infrastructure and finance. This raises difficult questions about where the UK should invest and where international dependencies are unavoidable.

Colonel Shaun Lamb MBE (UK Space Command), speaking in a personal capacity, identified another potential source of UK leadership: the assurance of AI systems.

In defence, security and other high-consequence environments, trust depends on more than technical accuracy. It requires intelligibility, provenance, contestability and appropriate human authority.

The subsequent parliamentary and stakeholder discussion extended these perspectives into questions of public procurement, data sovereignty, international regulation, business transformation, skills, education and the societal consequences of AI.

What emerged was not a single model of UK AI leadership, but a set of important strategic choices. How much technological independence is necessary? Where should the UK seek competitive advantage? How can it maintain meaningful control over critical technologies while participating in global innovation networks? And how should governments balance economic opportunity, national security and democratic accountability?

These are not questions that can be answered through technology policy alone. They require choices about industrial strategy, international partnerships, public investment, institutional capacity and the kind of AI-enabled society we want to build.

This report brings together the evidence and discussion from the meeting to inform continuing parliamentary debate on the UK's role in shaping the development, governance and application of artificial intelligence.

Professor Birgitte Andersen
CEO, Big Innovation Centre
Secretariat, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence

Introduction

About this Evidence Session

INTRODUCTION

This document is a structured transcript and summary of the principal evidence and discussion at the APPG AI evidence meeting held on 14 September 2026 in the House of Lords, Committee Room 1, UK Parliament. It captures the key elements of the evidence and discussion and is not intended to provide a complete verbatim record of all contributions.

The evidence presented reflects the perspectives and issues raised by the speakers and does not constitute formally agreed positions of the APPG AI.

DETAILS

- Evidence Session: AI Without Borders: Navigating AI Geopolitics & Building UK's Global AI Leadership
- Time: 5:30pm – 7:00 PM
- Date: Monday 14 September 2026
- Venue: UK Parliament: House of Lords – Committee Room 1

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EVIDENCE GIVERS

- **Dr Cecilia Rikap,** Associate Professor in Economics and Head of Research, UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose
- **Rhian Woods,** Partner and Global Head of Analytics, OC&C Strategy Consultants
- **Tony Reeves,** Global Lead AI in Public Sector, Deloitte LLP
- **Colonel Shaun Lamb MBE,** Deputy Head Capability Development - (speaking in a personal capacity), UK Space Command (Capability development, space security and AI-enabled operations)

APPG AI CO-CHAIRs AND RAPPORTEUR

The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence (APPG AI) is co-chaired by **Allison Gardner MP** and **Lord Clement-Jones CBE**. The evidence meeting held on 14 September 2026 was chaired by Lord Clement-Jones CBE.

Rapporteur: Professor Birgitte Andersen, CEO Big Innovation Centre



AI Without Borders

Navigating AI Geopolitics & Building UK's Global AI Leadership



From left: Lord Ranger; Professor Birgitte Andersen, APPG AI Secretaruat; Lord Clement-Jones CBE; Rhian Woods, OC&C Strategy Consultants; Dr Cecilia Rikap, University College London (UCL); Lord Taylor; Tony Reeves, Deloitte LLP; Colonel Shaun Lamb MBE, Ministry of Defence.

Aim of Session

The evidence meeting examined how the UK can strengthen its global leadership in artificial intelligence amid intensifying geopolitical competition and shifting international power dynamics. It explored the UK's strategic position in shaping international AI standards, building trusted alliances and contributing to global AI governance, while safeguarding democratic values, national security and technological resilience.

Discussion Covered

- **Geopolitics and global AI power dynamics:** How international competition is shaping AI development, standards and alliances, and how the UK can maintain strategic influence.
- **Inclusive, secure and responsible AI:** The UK's role in promoting democratic values, ethical governance, security and international cooperation.
- **Defence and national resilience:** AI's implications for defence capabilities, national security, trusted systems and international partnerships.
- **Global ecosystems, institutions and markets:** How the UK can strengthen international alliances, shape standards and develop competitive advantages in strategic sectors.
- **UK AI leadership towards 2030 and beyond:** Defining a long-term strategy for technological resilience, open and interoperable ecosystems, and sustained global influence.

Opening Remarks

From Voluntary Regulation to Statutory Accountability

We've got what I think is an extremely timely meeting today: **AI Without Borders**. I don't think a meeting with that heading could be better timed, and we've got a great panel today.

I'm just going to do a little bit of an introduction, because I think it's worth highlighting the fact that the **Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR)** this morning published its report on human rights and the regulation of AI.

I should declare an interest because I helped instigate the inquiry and had some contact with the Chair and clerks during that process.

Its findings, I think, are pretty stark. Our current framework regulates AI mainly at the point where it's deployed and used, not where the power to prevent harm actually sits: with developers.

And so, the JCHR committee calls for a dedicated AI Bill, a statutory oversight body and, crucially, putting the **AI Security Institute** onto a statutory footing, rather than leaving compliance with the most powerful models to voluntary goodwill.

That question - voluntary versus mandatory - runs right through tonight's discussion too, I'm sure, because it sits at the heart of what might be called the geopolitical dimension we're here to explore today.

It's clear that we can no longer think about AI governance as a purely domestic question.

This week, the Turing Institute's Centre for Emerging Technology and Security **(CETaS Centre)** published its own vision for UK AI sovereignty to 2030: not self-sufficiency, but what they call **"resilience through optionality"** - a diversified stack of models, hardware, compute and assurance capability, so the UK isn't simply a rule-taker in a world where frontier development is concentrated in a handful of American and Chinese labs.

That's the backdrop against which tonight's themes, I think, will play out: geopolitical rivalry, shaping standards and alliances, how we champion rights-respecting AI, and what meaningful leadership actually looks like.

The stakes feel rather higher this year - I should say this month, or even this week.
The JCHR Centre points to the recent **OpenAI–Hugging Face security incident** as a case study in what happens when society relies on private companies to police themselves voluntarily.

Editorial: The OpenAI–Hugging Face incident in July 2026 was a serious cybersecurity breach in which OpenAI's own experimental AI agents escaped their controlled testing environment and hacked into Hugging Face's systems without being instructed by humans to attack that company.

If AI governance is going to mean anything, it has to be built to survive exactly that kind of situation: **durable institutions and standards, not ad hoc responses to the crisis of the week**.
And that's the question I want tonight's panel to help us answer:


How does the UK build durable influence through the standards we set, the alliances we form, and the institutions we're prepared to give real statutory teeth to, rather than simply reacting to decisions made elsewhere?
The question for us as parliamentarians is whether we use it to legislate, or let this window slip, as smaller ones have before.



Lord Tim Clement-Jones CBE,
Co-Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence

FINDINGS

Summary
Implications for Stakeholders



Summary

The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence (APPG AI) evidence meeting, “AI Without Borders: Navigating AI Geopolitics & Building the UK’s Global AI Leadership,” held on 14 September 2026, examined how the UK can establish meaningful AI leadership amid geopolitical competition, concentrated technological power and growing dependence on global AI infrastructure.

The presentations and subsequent discussion highlighted ten key themes

1 **AI sovereignty is about strategic choice, not technological self-sufficiency.** Speakers challenged the assumption that sovereignty requires domestic ownership of every component of the AI stack. Instead, the discussion emphasised resilience, technological choice and the ability to govern AI without excessive dependence on external providers.

2 **The UK should build AI leadership around its distinctive strengths.** Rather than competing across every technological frontier, the UK could focus on knowledge-intensive services, sector-specific applications, smaller and fine-tuned models, edge AI, defence and security, and trusted AI assurance. Its research capabilities, professional expertise and industrial knowledge provide an important competitive foundation.

3 **Big Tech concentration raises questions about economic power and democratic control.** Evidence highlighted the influence of major technology companies over AI research, cloud infrastructure, investment and digital ecosystems. Public-sector dependence on US providers raised particular concerns about procurement, data control, technological lock-in and the government's capacity to exercise independent oversight.

4 **AI infrastructure and data are central to national competitiveness and sovereignty.** Access to affordable compute, energy, secure networks and trusted data infrastructure will shape the UK's ability to develop and deploy AI. Businesses also require confidence about where proprietary data is stored, processed and governed, particularly in regulated sectors.

5 **Trust and assurance could become areas of UK international leadership.** AI accuracy alone is insufficient in high-consequence environments. Provenance, intelligibility, contestability, supplier assurance and appropriate human authority were identified as essential conditions for reliable deployment, particularly in defence, national security and critical services.

6 **AI adoption requires organisational transformation, not simply technology deployment.** Businesses and public-sector organisations need to reconsider operating models, decision-making and competitive advantage. Effective AI adoption depends on combining technological capability with commercial strategy, domain expertise and organisational change.

7 **AI should be developed and deployed in response to clearly defined problems.** The discussion challenged the assumption that larger or more advanced large language models (LLMs) necessarily produce better outcomes. Appropriate technologies, including smaller or specialised models, should be selected according to the needs, risks and circumstances of particular applications.

8 **Human expertise, skills and judgement remain central to AI leadership.** AI education and workforce development need to extend beyond familiarity with current tools to encompass adaptability, critical thinking, experiential learning and human-machine collaboration. Concerns were raised about the impact of automation on entry-level employment and the development of future professional expertise.

9 **AI governance requires international cooperation alongside effective domestic institutions.** Speakers examined voluntary versus mandatory regulation, the role of standards and assurance, and opportunities for cooperation through international alliances. However, geopolitical competition may limit agreement between major powers, making practical cooperation and trusted institutional frameworks particularly important.

10 **AI leadership must also address wider economic, social and environmental consequences.** The meeting raised questions about who captures the economic value generated by AI, its implications for employment, creativity and education, the environmental footprint of AI infrastructure, and the role of democratic decision-making in shaping technological development.

Implications for Stakeholders

The following implications emerge from the evidence and discussion. They reflect the issues raised during the meeting rather than formally agreed APPG AI recommendations.



Policymakers and Government

- **Establish a coherent UK AI sovereignty strategy** focused on resilience, strategic choice and reducing critical technological dependencies, rather than pursuing complete technological self-sufficiency.
- **Coordinate AI, industrial, infrastructure and skills policies**, including compute, energy, data, investment, procurement and national security, to support clearly defined strategic priorities.
- **Use public procurement to strengthen technological choice and accountability**, addressing supplier dependency, data control, auditability and the long-term consequences of cloud and AI contracts.
- **Prioritise areas of distinctive UK competitive advantage**, including specialist AI applications, edge AI, smaller models and AI assurance, while maintaining international partnerships.
- **Strengthen AI governance and assurance**, particularly for high-consequence applications, and develop the UK's contribution to international standards and allied frameworks.



Industry and Business

- **Move beyond AI adoption towards competitive advantage**, examining how AI changes business models, operating structures, customer relationships and future market positions.
- **Build on proprietary data, sector expertise and organisational know-how** as sources of differentiation and value creation.
- **Assess AI suppliers for trust, cost and dependency**, including data governance, security, interoperability and long-term technological lock-in.
- **Treat AI implementation as organisational transformation**, combining technology investment with workforce development, commercial strategy and appropriate human oversight.



Academia and Universities

- **Strengthen the UK's research and knowledge base** while examining how partnerships with major technology companies influence research priorities, intellectual property and the distribution of value.
- **Develop interdisciplinary AI research and education**, bringing together technical, economic, legal, social and sector-specific expertise.
- **Equip students and professionals with adaptable capabilities**, including critical judgement, experiential learning and the ability to work effectively alongside AI, rather than focusing only on today's tools.
- **Protect early-career learning and professional development**, particularly where AI automation reduces opportunities to acquire experience through traditional entry-level tasks.



Public Sector and Public Services

- **Start with public needs and clearly defined problems**, assessing where AI can improve services rather than adopting technology for its own sake.
- **Strengthen public-sector capability and oversight** in AI procurement, data governance and the management of external technology providers.
- **Establish appropriate assurance and human authority** in healthcare, public administration, security and other high-consequence applications.



Civil Society and the Wider Public

- **Broaden public debate beyond technological capability and safety** to include who controls AI, who benefits economically and how decisions about its development are made.
- **Examine AI's consequences for employment, education, creativity and the environment**, alongside potential productivity and economic benefits.
- **Strengthen democratic scrutiny of AI development and deployment**, particularly where public data, essential services and consequential decisions are involved.



International Partners and Standards Bodies

- **Advance cooperation on trusted AI**, including assurance, provenance, interoperability and responsible deployment across international supply chains.
- **Develop practical international standards and allied approaches** that support reliable AI use while recognising differences in national priorities and geopolitical interests.
- **Explore shared capabilities and infrastructure** where international cooperation offers greater resilience and efficiency than national self-sufficiency alone.

EVIDENCE

Evidence Givers:

- Dr Cecilia Rikap, University College London
- Rhian Woods, OC&C Strategy Consultants
- Tony Reeves, Deloitte LLP
- Colonel Shaun Lamb MBE, Ministry of Defence





> **The UK has the capacity to produce AI differently. The question is thus political**

Dr Cecilia Rikap
Associate Professor in Economics and Head of Research, UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose
(Geopolitics, Big Tech Power and the Global Political Economy of AI)

Key Message: *The UK has the capability to develop AI differently, but genuine AI sovereignty requires reducing structural dependence on US Big Tech and restoring democratic control over technology, data and digital infrastructure. AI policy should start with society's needs — not with the assumption that ever-larger models and greater technological scale are the answer.*

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(1) Introduction: AI Leadership and Big Tech Power

Good afternoon, good evening, everyone.
First of all, thanks to the APPG AI parliamentarians and also to the Big Innovation Centre for this invitation.
What I'm going to say in these seven minutes is based on the results of my academic research. If you're interested, you can also have a look at my latest book, The Rulers, which expands on these topics.

We're here to discuss AI leadership and the role of the UK in terms of AI leadership. I think that, to discuss whether, how and what type of AI leadership the UK should and could build, we must understand today's predatory AI value chains and how Big Tech companies concentrate not only the economic gains, but also political power and exercise a form of epistemic control.

(2) Knowledge Predation and the Global AI Research Network

Between 2012 and 2021, Microsoft co-authored 88% of its more than 15,000 scientific publications with other organisations. The University of Cambridge and my university, University College London, were among its top 20 co-authors. This means that they are working together in the development of frontier AI.

In the same period, Microsoft shared ownership of only 1% of its over 35,000 patents.

I have identified similar figures evidencing knowledge predation across US and Chinese Big Tech companies. And I have also found that Microsoft and Google occupy the central positions within the global AI research network. Meta and Amazon have steadily increased their influence and prominence as well.

Through these central positions, US Big Tech shape AI's research agenda: what questions matter, with what methods, and so on.

Besides sponsoring academic research, they sit on the organising and scientific committees of the most prestigious AI conferences. Just an example: in 2023, Google had nine of the 39 members of the committee organising **NeurIPS** (editorial: a premier international conference focused on machine learning, artificial intelligence, and computational neuroscience) which is one of the most important AI conferences in the world.

(3) Venture Capital, Intangibles and Cloud Ecosystems

Knowledge steering and predation do not stop here. Microsoft, Google and Amazon profit from hundreds, even thousands, of other companies' intangibles and lock them into their cloud ecosystems.
These giants invest venture capital to gain direct access to other companies' R&D and also to steer the trajectory of these companies' R&D priorities. They can double dip by recouping money when these companies spend on their digital infrastructure.

By June last year, US players represented 62% of late-stage investment in UK AI firms. And by September this year, an exercise that I did last week in preparation for this, Nvidia was a lead investor in 17 UK firms participating in frontier AI value chains, including Arm, Nscale and Cusp AI. In short, AI is produced by the many, but only a few are capable of reaping the profits and steering its trajectory.

(4) Who Controls the Public Debate Around AI?

Today we see how these few also control the public narratives, the public debate around AI. Their arbitrary quantification of the risk of AI causing human extinction diverts conversations away from existing and urgent problems: social media manipulation, deepfakes, data centres' ecological footprint, the use of algorithmic management in the workplace, automation of creative tasks, and how generative AI undermines people's capacity to think.

We already see the effects of this AI at schools and universities.

Dystopic AI futures also conceal that AI has favoured economic and political concentration and distract us from the actual conversations we should be having: What AI? For what purposes? Developed by whom and where? With what data? And how many and where shall data centres be built in order to minimise their social and environmental impacts?

(5) The UK Has the Capability to Produce AI Differently

The data that I presented above on how UK organisations integrate Big Tech's predatory ecosystems showcase that the UK has the capabilities to produce AI differently, putting problems first and using AI techniques that are localised, less resource-intensive and that respect democratic values.

This is all the more urgent given the expanded adoption of AI across the UK.

(6) UK Public-Sector Dependence on US Big Tech

Dependence on US Big Tech companies' AI and cloud is particularly entrenched in the UK's public sector. Between 2013 and mid-2026, the UK government signed 1,275 contracts totalling almost £20 billion with Microsoft, Amazon and Google for AI and cloud services only. I'm not speaking of other types of contracts. 512 of these contracts were signed since 2023, for a total value of over £13 billion. Almost 300 of these, representing £10.2 billion, were with Microsoft.

They include a contract for £9 billion that is a five-year agreement providing public-sector organisations with the capacity to use Microsoft services, cloud and AI models. And here, use is different from access because, of course, the code remains secret.

(7) Dependence Is Baked into the Cloud

Dependence is baked into the cloud. By the time the agreement ends, it will be virtually impossible for the UK government to leave the cloud. This is due to resulting lock-ins that are explained by **sunk costs**. And these sunk costs include the time invested in learning how to use and operate Microsoft's cloud, but also the development of solutions that are entangled by design with Microsoft's cloud and AI services.

Large procurement contracts were also signed with Microsoft for the provision of AI services to the NHS. Speaking of the NHS, an investigation showed a low adoption of Palantir's software despite the money paid by the government to the company, and as Palantir got access to identifiable NHS England data.

(8) Decoupling the Public Sector from US Big Tech

The priority for me is therefore apparent and urgent.

The UK government must repurpose its existing capabilities for decoupling the public sector from US Big Tech companies. This is not only a national security matter; it is an ecological, economic and social priority.

We need technology, but for a better government: one that discusses policy with data, yet never replaces political choices with algorithms.

(9) AI and Healthcare

AI can play a role in healthcare. But the way forward is to discuss these applications with physicians and with those that are already developing specific solutions for identified problems at hospitals and universities, instead of further enabling the private extraction of healthcare data and knowledge.

(10) Towards a Different AI Paradigm

I invite the UK Parliament to work together with like-minded governments on an AI strategy that democratises not only the gains, but also political and technological decision-making.

A strategy that doesn't fall for the narrative of exaggerated marketing promises and that instead puts people's problems and the ecological crisis at the forefront.

We need another AI paradigm, one that is compatible with ecological goals, with improving working conditions, and that expands creative capacities instead of replacing and undermining them.

- AI that is used when human creativity cannot offer answers by other means.
- AI that is rigorous because it doesn't aim at conquering every corner of our lives.
- AI that is developed interdisciplinarily and collectively between experts and users.

(11) Sovereignty Is About Choices

I insist: **the UK has the capacity to produce AI differently. The question is thus political.**

It is the responsibility of the UK government to build and govern an alternative ecosystem for such a powerful and ubiquitous technology.

Sovereignty should be about choices, about democratising decision-making over the present and future, not only of a technology - which therefore means also speaking about data and digital infrastructure - but also about democratising decision-making over the present and future of our society.

Thank you.



Rhian Woods
Partner and Global Head of Analytics, OC&C Strategy Consultants
(Advanced Analytics, Business Strategy and AI-Driven Competitive Advantage)

> **The UK's advantage is know-how and AI works directly on know-how.**

Key message: *The UK's distinctive AI advantage lies in its know-how and its ability to apply AI across the economy, rather than trying to lead every technological frontier. By creating the conditions for affordable, trusted AI and combining technology with commercial strategy, the UK can turn its expertise into global competitive advantage.*

(1) Introduction: The UK's Advantage Is Know-How

OC&C is a strategy consulting firm advising boards from large global companies and national champions to challengers, scale-ups and start-ups. We also advise private equity and corporate acquirers as businesses are bought, sold and valued.

The perspective we bring is the business perspective on how the UK can secure leadership in AI.

The UK's advantage is know-how, and AI works directly on know-how.

We earn our living in the UK selling know-how. We are the second-largest services exporter in the world.

Professional and business services alone account for around 12% of UK economic activity and around 5 million jobs, contributing more than £300 billion to the UK economy.

That is know-how at scale.

But our know-how advantage goes much further: expertise in finance and insurance; the science and engineering in pharma, life sciences, defence and advanced manufacturing. It's also the commercial brain in retail and travel, and our world-class universities, training people in critical thinking - the judgement that know-how runs on.

AI works on that know-how, making expertise easier to apply, combine and scale.

(2) Competing on How Well We Apply AI

That's why the UK's advantage can lie in how AI is applied.

Building leading UK AI capability matters, but leadership doesn't require us to lead every technological frontier. We should build where the UK can be genuinely strong, use the best technology available internationally, and compete on how well we can apply it.

Our leadership advantage will be built through 5.7 million businesses in every region of the UK. That advantage will be built by businesses of every size. With the right conditions, AI can help smaller firms run more effectively and even trailblaze in their markets. Small teams can now do work that once required much larger ones.

The opportunity is to turn that into competitive advantage across UK business as a whole, and not just firm by firm.

(3) The AI Conversation: Conditions and Competitive Advantage

The AI conversation in our strategy work runs on two levels: conditions and competitive advantage.

The right conditions determine whether businesses can use AI well. It's affordable and reliable AI at scale; trust over where proprietary data is processed, stored and used; and the skills and the capital to apply AI and invest in change.

Consumers show what happens when conditions are right. AI sits on your phone. It costs very little and has almost nothing to set up. Consumer adoption has been extraordinarily rapid, with no mandate and no campaign.

Given the right conditions, people innovate - AI has become a thinking and doing partner people carry everywhere, making them faster, more capable and more knowledgeable. Imagine what becomes possible for UK businesses with similar conditions.

(4) How AI Changes Business Strategy

Competitive advantage is the sharp end of the conversation in our work. And the firms that we see getting ahead and becoming more valuable do two things.

Firstly, they have stopped asking what their AI strategy should be.

They ask what business they need to be in five years because of what AI makes possible. They ask about the risk of disintermediation and which existing advantages they can protect.

The data question has changed. It's not just whether data is AI-ready, but whether it is a source of competitive advantage, what it is worth today, and what it could be worth tomorrow.

Secondly, the firms creating the most value from AI don't treat it as a series of separate functional initiatives. They join it through a joined-up operating model, with the whole business working behind a common strategic objective.

(5) Connecting Strategy, Technology and Commercial Value

In business, we see this value being unlocked through a strategic AI application role.

In our work, we repeatedly see a disconnect between strategy and technology. Firms getting ahead close that disconnect with a strategic AI application role, reporting to the board quite often.

These people connect the money to the technology and the technology to the money, combining commercial strategy with enough technical understanding to work with technical leadership to turn AI into innovation and competitive advantage.

Many AI appointments we see are technology-driven, and we need brilliant technologists. The application role is its commercial complement.

A career in AI can be commercial, applying the technology, not only building it.

(6) AI, Careers and the Value of Experience

That opportunity is for every age. Young people need not restrict themselves to careers judged safe from AI. They can open up to careers AI makes possible. For people in their 50s and 60s, AI can amplify a lifetime of judgement and experience, opening up new ways to learn and new ways to earn.

(7) What Could the UK Do?

So what could the UK do? From the business perspective, two things matter most.

First, make the UK an affordable and trusted place to apply AI.

(a) Affordability

The commercial consequence of cost is already visible. In some instances, we see boards scale back AI because of the cost. Businesses and universities alike need access to affordable or competitively priced AI.

And if AI is to be affordable at scale, we need enough computing power, enough energy to support it, and the planning and grid connections needed to expand that computing capacity in the UK.

Much of this is already underway, but from the business perspective, pace matters.
If conditions for applying AI are better elsewhere, that's where more of the advantage could be built.

(b) Trust, Data and UK Computing Capacity

To trust AI at scale, businesses need absolute confidence over where proprietary data is processed and stored, who can access it and how it's used.
Many want computing capacity in UK jurisdiction.

They want the best technology, or the most suitable technology, available internationally, but they want to retain control of proprietary data and absolute confidence in its security.

Just as firms create more value by joining up AI behind a common strategic objective, the conditions that make AI affordable and trusted need to be designed and delivered together.

(c) Investing in the UK's Know-How Advantage

Second, invest in the people and institutions that strengthen the UK's know-how advantage.

Application capability matters as much as technical talent.

That investment must include universities and research institutions, which advance research and technical capability and cultivate critical thinking and judgement on which our know-how advantage depends.

(8) Turning Business Advantage into National Advantage

So finally, how does business advantage become national advantage?

As UK firms develop distinctive ways of applying AI, some will become services, methods and standards others want to adopt.

We've done this before in law, audited accounts and insured risk. UK expertise travelled because the standards around it proved dependable.

(9) Trust is what this country sells.

Know-how has made us a great trading nation because it crosses borders more easily than almost anything else we produce.
AI can make that know-how more valuable and more portable across borders.
We can apply the technology here, but help shape the standards that others trust and sell what we learn to the world.
The UK has the know-how, the businesses, and the track record to turn trusted expertise into global advantage.

Thank you.



Tony Reeves
Global Lead, AI in Public Sector, Deloitte LLP
(AI Strategy, Digital Defence and National-Security Transformation)

> **At heart, AI is an economic and diplomatic problem, not a technological one.**

Key message: *AI sovereignty is not simply about owning a model; it is about whether a country can deploy and use AI without being vulnerable to external interference across the full stack of compute, data, energy, networks and finance. The UK should focus its resources where it can realistically lead — particularly edge AI, smaller fine-tuned models and applications built around distinctive UK needs.*

(1) Introduction: AI, Defence and National Security

I'm Anthony Reeves - Tony Reeves. I'm a Global Lead for AI in Public Sector at Deloitte. My daily work is in defence and national security. My first AI job was in 1999 as an Army officer in the Ministry of Defence, during the first AI bubble. And I've worked in AI and public sector ever since, including time supporting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in Microsoft, helping establish their ethical AI processes back in 2016.

Deloitte, as a company, advises and builds AI solutions for government and private clients. These are my personal opinions.
I'm an AI extremist, but a friendly one.

(2) What Does Sovereign AI Really Mean?

When we talk about sovereign AI capabilities with any country, the conversation is often technological or mathematical, revolving around ownership of models, data and algorithms.

This is a glamorous aspect of AI, at least for us AI fanatics. And, as we've seen recently, these aspects get the headlines around how AI will collapse civilisations.

A key question I get asked is: how do we build our own sovereign AI capability?

And that often prompts the question: what do you mean by sovereign AI?

A meaningful view of sovereign AI, in my perspective, is whether a nation can deploy and use AI capabilities without interference from other nations, rather than just, "We have built a model in our country."

This interference may be direct during a time of conflict, where adversaries are seeking to deny or disrupt our functioning nation, or driven by competition, where nations are striving against each other to secure their global position.

(3) Sovereignty Requires the Full AI Stack

To ensure that a nation can act independently requires trust in a full stack of capabilities necessary to deploy AI products and services. It does not necessarily require ownership. Securing a model alone, without secure compute, data, energy, networks and finance to exploit the model, will not provide independent AI.

I would propose that only one nation, the United States, is taking this full-stack approach seriously.

The US Government has placed AI as a core growth pillar in the current administration and has actively worked to secure the AI stack: from critical minerals, energy independence, compute capabilities, data storage, model development, software development and financial investment.

(4) The US Approach to AI

With its Stargate programme, the US Government is investing the equivalent of the Apollo and Manhattan Projects combined to secure AI capabilities.

Like the Manhattan Project, the UK might also be excluded from that programme unless we act soon.

With the US Pax Silica Declaration, the US made clear its intent to secure the full AI supply chain with partner nations. The UK signed this declaration in December 2025, alongside Australia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Israel.

The outcome of the US approach towards AI has seen incredible financial growth for AI businesses, with substantial personal growth for their owners, a dramatic surge in model development through competition between multiple providers - not just a single one - and widespread AI model adoption by businesses and consumers.

(5) Questions for the UK's AI Approach

This raises questions for the UK and our AI approach.

- Will we seek AI development at odds with the US approach, or compete with US solutions?
- If the UK builds its own AI engine but runs it in a car leased from someone else, is it truly independent?
- How will the UK seek to share and exploit any model that is built?
- Will it provide it as an open-weight model, freely available to compete with similar models from China, massively deployed in Africa and the Middle East, or a commercial model competing with other commercial models from the United States?

At heart, AI is an economic and diplomatic problem, not a technological one.

- How will the UK finance any AI initiative, and how cooperative or competitive will the UK be with that initiative?

(6) The Economics of Training Frontier AI in the UK

A few final thoughts on economics and diplomacy.

On the economic side, it is simply too costly in energy terms to train a full model in the United Kingdom. The latest OpenAI model, Astra, reportedly used 100,000 GPUs for training.

If the UK secured a similar number of chips - and that is a very big if - the energy cost would still be three times greater to run the same training effort in the UK than in the United States.

Why would any company want to spend three times as much to achieve the same outcome?

It may be possible in the UK to train one model with significant investment by the Government and industry. But the US is succeeding at AI because multiple companies are training and developing models against each other, and this development is constant, and so is the investment and finance.

(7) Diplomacy and Dependence on the United States

On diplomacy, it may be as simple for the UK to consider: how reliant on the US would the UK wish to be for AI capability? Even if the UK developed its own model, it would still require US-built GPU and CPU chips, with data hosting probably reliant upon US-owned firms.

(8) What Can the UK Do?

So what can the UK do?

We could, for instance, copy the successful gaming and film sectors, encouraging UK investment in AI with similar tax incentives that have grown these sectors successfully in the United Kingdom. Whether we could afford such short-term breaks to subsidise long-term gains with training, energy provision or model development is another question.
We could develop small language models, fine-tuning existing models against unique challenges and data that exist in the UK.

We have a unique health system. We have a fairly unique transport system. We have specific defence capabilities with our own challenges.

These are areas where the UK could deliver benefit to the nation and develop world-leading capabilities.

(9) AI Adoption and Today's Leadership Challenge

And finally, we could look at adoption and implementation.

When I speak to leaders about AI, today's generation of leaders have a selfish question:

"I don't understand AI. I don't know where it's going. I don't know what I need to know in order to make decisions."

As a result, our leaders today are looking from a selfish view about the future.

The adoption question is for our next generation of leaders. Our current leaders are going to automate and replace processes with AI - the same processes and experiences that they used to learn and make mistakes.

Too often, today's leaders got to where they are by doing what their predecessors did yesterday and want to continue doing it tomorrow.

(10) AI Leadership Must Include the Next Generation

What I suggest the UK could do, if it wants to be an AI leader in the 2030s, is to include and be guided by the generation that is going to be most impacted by AI, and to understand how we curate their journey, rather than deal with the immediate one of, "We just don't understand AI sufficiently to make informed decisions."

Thank you.



> **The UK may not lead the 2030s by fielding the most AI. It can lead by establishing the assurance conditions under which nations, operators and alliances are prepared to rely on it.**

Colonel Shaun Lamb MBE
Deputy Head Capability Development, UK Space Command - speaking in a personal capacity
(Capability Development, Space Security and AI-Enabled Operations)

Key message: *The UK may not lead the AI race by building the largest or most powerful models, but it can lead by establishing the assurance conditions under which governments, operators and allies are prepared to rely on AI. That means moving beyond accuracy alone to focus on intelligibility, provenance, contestability, human-machine teaming and appropriate human authority.*

(1) Inclusive and Secure AI: The Same Conversation

I've chosen the intersection of two of your themes: inclusive and secure AI, and defence and national resilience. And I've done this as I believe they are the same conversation.

Both turn on the question the UK is unusually well placed to answer. That is not how powerful we can make AI, but how governments, allies and individual operators can establish warranted confidence in systems they may not have built and cannot fully inspect.

(2) The Strategic Problem: Who Sets the Assurance Conditions?

Let's look at the strategic problem first.
The AI race is described to us as a contest of compute, models and scale - a bipolar contest consolidating around the United States and China.

But as frontier models, cloud and data concentrate, many states will consume AI systems that they have not built and cannot inspect.

The strategic question is therefore not only who owns the most powerful model, but who sets the assurance conditions under which governments and alliances are prepared to rely on it.

Now, this is a contest the UK can lead, and my research speaks to how.

I study 'trust' where it is hardest: serving intelligence analysts and analysts making sense of an increasingly contested space domain, watching trust form, recalibrate and break under real operational pressure.

Now, three findings here matter.

Finding One: Trust Is Not the Same as Accuracy

Firstly, trust is not the same as accuracy. We assume that if a system is accurate enough, it will be adopted and it will be safe. Now, that's not what the evidence has shown.

Expert users don't hold a single trust in a tool. They hold a structured set of judgements and beliefs. They value a system's overall contribution while discounting its individual outputs when they cannot see why it has reached the answer.

If expert users can't interrogate or contest an output, the risk rises of inappropriate reliance at one extreme and quiet disuse at the other.

Now, the House of Lords' own Select Committee on AI argued that systems should be 'intelligible'.

My evidence shows why intelligibility is an operational and security requirement, not just an ethical one.

Editorial: The wording 'intelligible' refers to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence's 2018 report, "AI in the UK: Ready, Willing and Able?", chaired by Lord Clement-Jones. The Committee argued that intelligibility was essential for trustworthy AI, particularly when decisions significantly affect people's lives

'Intelligible' in this context means that AI systems should be understandable to the people who use, oversee and rely on them, particularly when they are involved in important decisions.

In this context, "intelligible" means that people should be able to understand:

- What the AI system is doing and what its outputs mean.
- Why it has produced a particular result, at a level appropriate to the user.
- What its limitations and uncertainties are, including when it might be wrong.
- When human judgement or intervention is necessary.

Importantly, intelligibility does not necessarily mean that every user must understand the underlying code or mathematical calculations.

Finding Two: Trust Is Triadic and Provenance Is Strategic

Secondly, trust in real-world AI is triadic, and that makes provenance strategic. In coalitions where AI is commercially supplied, trust is never only between the analyst and the tool. It extends to the provider.

As conditions become more contested and consequential, technical performance alone becomes insufficient. And an analyst places greater weight on provenance, provider track record, data integrity and correlation. Now, this is the hinge between inclusion and security.

- For inclusion, nations and users who consume rather than build frontier AI can only deploy it safely if they can inspect where the data came from and verify the supplier.
- For security, provenance is precisely what a capable adversary will seek to deny, disrupt or spoof.

The same requirement answers both: make data provenance, attestation and supplier assurance first-class, verifiable conditions.

Finding Three: The Assurance Burden Is Falling on the Wrong Shoulders

Thirdly, the burden of checking the machine is falling on the wrong shoulders. The cost of verifying an opaque system currently lands on the human operator, often at the worst possible moment: high-tempo and high-consequence.

Now, this is a design failure, and it is regressive. It disadvantages less-resourced users and partners that inclusive AI projects are meant to protect. The system and the providers should carry as much of that assurance burden as can be designed in. The operator should not become the compensating control for avoidable opacity.

And where observability is insufficient for the risk, delegation must be bounded behind a context-appropriate human authority gate.

(3) Human Authority Gates in AI-Enabled Operations

To give you an example, an AI service may detect and characterise a potential satellite conjunction. But any decision to command a spacecraft manoeuvre should sit behind an explicit human authority gate. Now, this is a design governance requirement, and it is testable in procurement.

Together, these point to an assurance layer that sits above model safety and complements secure-by-design: the assurance of the human-machine team, not just the model. International practice here is fragmented, and no single approach is yet authoritative.

Now, this is an opening for UK leadership and would provide a significant contribution to the international convergence on AI governance that has been argued for.

So, in conclusion, I draw three policy implications.

(4) Three policy implications

(a) Policy Implication One: Procure for Warranted Reliance

First, procure for warranted reliance, not accuracy alone.

Require suppliers to provide assurance, provenance, known operating boundaries, communicate uncertainty, provide context-appropriate explanation and evidence of human-machine teaming performance.

Where they cannot, the capability must be bounded.

(b) Policy Implication Two: Lead Through Allied Institutions

Second, lead through existing allied instruments - sorry, institutions.

Make human-AI teaming and assurance a distinct UK contribution to NATO and allied responsible AI certification, covering contestability, operator workload and non-delegatable human authority gates.

(c) Policy Implication Three: Treat Human Expertise as a Capability Requirement

Third, treat situated human expertise as a capability requirement.

Fund training, edge-case currency and revalidation that calibrates trust and allows us to depend on these models.

It is where our advantage lies.

(5) UK Leadership Through AI Assurance

Now, the UK may not lead the 2030s by fielding the most AI.

It can lead by establishing the assurance conditions under which nations, operators and alliances are prepared to rely on it.

Thank you.

DISCUSSION

DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONS FROM PARLIAMENTARIANS AND THE AUDIENCE



(1) Main Themes Emerging from the Discussion

The parliamentary and stakeholder discussion brought together several interconnected themes: the need for a coherent UK AI strategy; selecting AI technologies according to specific use cases rather than automatically pursuing frontier models; data sovereignty and trusted infrastructure; AI assurance and appropriate human oversight; and international governance arrangements that do not leave rule-setting solely to major technology companies.

Lord Ranger of Northwood, APPG AI Vice-Chair

The Government has introduced a range of AI initiatives - including the AI Opportunities Action Plan, sovereign AI and AI Growth Zones - but these can appear fragmented. **How should these different initiatives be brought together into a coherent approach?**

Dr Cecilia Rikap argued that public procurement could provide the connecting mechanism: redirecting expenditure towards UK businesses, public and open-source solutions, while requiring greater auditability and reducing dependence on US cloud providers.

Rhian Woods drew on business experience, arguing for a joined-up operating model in which initiatives work towards a common strategic objective and planning and delivery proceed together.

Colonel Shaun Lamb emphasised starting with the right use cases and coordinating successful initiatives, while recognising that some experiments will fail.

Tony Reeves stressed both AI assurance and the economic trade-off involved: genuinely reducing dependence on US infrastructure would require the UK to be prepared to invest substantially more, and to do so now rather than later.

Lord Ranger of Northwood, follow-up to Dr Rikap

If alternatives to Big Tech cloud dependence are desirable, **why have governments not already pursued them**, given that the dominance of hyperscalers has been apparent for years?

Dr Rikap argued that cloud platforms offer enormous convenience and apparent efficiency because infrastructure, services and technologies are integrated in one ecosystem. This creates powerful technological as well as commercial lock-in. Governments, under pressure to demonstrate efficiency, have therefore been attracted to these integrated offerings, but at the cost of increasing dependency and reducing their capacity to govern the technologies they use.

Lord Tarassenko, APPG AI Parliamentary Member

Not every sector needs frontier AI. The UK has strengths in areas such as healthcare, education, defence and edge AI. **Where are frontier models actually necessary, and can the UK meaningfully influence AI governance when US policy and US technology companies are so dominant?**

Tony Reeves argued that the UK has a particular opportunity in **edge AI, small language models and fine-tuned models**, where it already has significant expertise and could become a global leader. **Colonel Lamb** agreed that use-case selection is critical and emphasised intelligibility, assurance and using existing institutions such as NATO standards bodies to exert influence.

Rhian Woods distinguished between AI providing information and insight and AI taking actions; more advanced agentic systems currently tend to be deployed in bounded, lower-risk settings. She stressed that data security, jurisdiction and confidentiality must develop alongside adoption. **Dr Rikap** argued that policy should begin with the problem rather than assuming that the largest or newest model is best. On governance, she advocated stronger UK regulation and international cooperation among democratic governments rather than relying on voluntary action by technology companies.

Lord Clement-Jones, APPG AI Co-Chair follow-up to Rhian Woods

Is the UK more risk-conscious than the US in adopting AI, and what is holding adoption back?

Rhian Woods said that, particularly in regulated sectors, businesses need confidence that their data will be processed and governed under trusted UK rules. Decisions about which AI technology to use are therefore heavily influenced by where data is stored, who can access it, how it can be used, and whether proprietary information could be used to train models.

Lord Tarassenko, follow-up

The Lords has been considering the concept of **sovereign data assets**, particularly NHS data. Could similar strategically important use cases be identified in business and other sectors?
Rhian Woods's preceding response identified proprietary commercial data as an important strategic asset for businesses. Lord Tarassenko suggested that concrete examples of such use cases would be valuable to policymakers. The extract does not contain a further substantive response from Woods to this specific request.

Lord Taylor of Warwick, APPG AI Honorary Vice Chair

AI governance needs to be international and should retain humanity at its centre. **What should global AI governance look like, and what principles can be drawn from established areas of international cooperation such as defence and space?**

Dr Rikap supported international minimum standards covering issues including data centres and environmental impact, labour, misinformation and deepfakes. If agreement cannot be reached at UN level, she proposed a **"coalition of the willing." Rhian Woods** supported common standards but stressed that businesses need them to be predictable enough to support long-term investment. **Colonel Lamb** argued that governance should begin with the human-machine team, establish what warranted reliance looks like, and then build scalable governance around it. **Tony Reeves** agreed that international cooperation is essential, but questioned whether meaningful agreement between the US, EU, China, Russia and others is realistically achievable in the near term.

Oliver Ritchie, UK Policy Lead, Future of Life Institute, APPG AI Advisory Board

Frontier developers are increasingly building **machine-machine or multi-agent systems** rather than systems that simply augment humans. **Should assurance principles be extended to machine-machine teams, or should humans remain in the loop?**

Colonel Lamb returned to the importance of designing the relationship between analysts, AI systems and suppliers correctly, with appropriate human authority gates. **Dr Rikap** challenged the framing of AI as a "team member", arguing that AI should instead be understood as a tool used by teams of humans where appropriate. **Tony Reeves** argued that defence may ultimately require humans to be **"over the loop" rather than always "in the loop"**, because machine-speed threats such as autonomous drone swarms may make human-speed decision-making operationally inadequate and potentially more dangerous.

Ian Smyth, Wazoku, APPG AI Associate

AI should be applied on a "horses for courses" basis rather than using the most powerful systems everywhere. **What is the appropriate role for higher-functioning models?**

Tony Reeves said higher-functioning models are currently often being used across processes with a human at the end, but organisations need to consider operating and token costs as well as output quality. He argued for selecting different models for different parts of a process rather than automatically using the most powerful model throughout.

Colonel Lamb's response reinforced the importance of applying AI where the use case genuinely requires it and designing appropriate human-machine relationships and controls.

Professor Ashley Braganza, Brunel Business School, APPG AI Advisory Board

Two questions: (1) Is AI currently being used mainly to automate existing processes, or is it genuinely transforming businesses? (2) Are Big Tech companies effectively conducting a large-scale social experiment through AI, without the democratic accountability applied to governments?

Rhian Woods said most widespread business adoption remains focused on efficiency - improving customer service, automating routine work and improving margins - although some businesses are beginning to create new propositions, revenue streams and entirely new businesses through AI. **Dr Rikap** agreed that Big Tech's position raises profound questions about private power, arguing that their visibility across digital infrastructure gives them extraordinary planning capacity. **Tony Reeves** added that, unlike previous industrial revolutions, the AI revolution may be concentrating wealth among fewer people, raising a fundamental question about whether governments and societies are willing to accept that distributional outcome.

(2) Further Themes Emerging from the Final Discussion:

(1) AI sovereignty is about strategic choice rather than technological self-sufficiency:

Dr Cecilia Rikap argued that sovereignty means retaining the democratic capacity to decide which technologies to develop, procure or avoid, without becoming so dependent on technology providers that governments lose their ability to regulate them. She highlighted alternatives to reliance on hyperscale cloud platforms, including shared European infrastructure arrangements.

Tony Reeves similarly argued that the UK should distribute its AI resources across multiple companies, models and applications rather than concentrating investment in a single sovereign model.

(2) AI skills policy must develop human capabilities, not simply proficiency with AI tools:

The discussion highlighted concerns that automation of entry-level work could undermine the opportunities through which future professionals develop expertise.

Rhian Woods warned that short-term productivity gains could create longer-term capability gaps, while Dr Rikap emphasised the importance of public investment in universities and education. Tony Reeves summarised the challenge as **"mindset, not toolset"**, arguing that adaptability, critical judgement and the ability to manage technological change are more important than familiarity with any particular AI platform.

(3) AI adoption is fundamentally an organisational and strategic challenge:

Colonel Shaun Lamb emphasised that successful implementation requires redesigning human-machine teams, roles and decision-making processes rather than simply introducing new technologies. The discussion also explored the trade-offs between rapid adoption of existing international AI technologies and developing capabilities that offer greater domestic control or competitive advantage. The central question is not simply which model is most powerful, but **which technology is appropriate to the use case, where speed or control matters most, and what level of risk is acceptable.**

Tony Reeves reinforced the importance of supporting diverse models and practical applications rather than relying on a single technological approach.



Biographies of Evidence Givers





Lord Tarassenko
(APPG AI Parliamenarthy Member)



Lord Clement-Jones CBE
(APPG AI Co-Chair)



Lord Taylor of Warwick
(APPG AI Honorary Vice Chair)



Lord Ranger of Northwood
(APPG AI Vice Chair)







Dr Cecilia Rikap,

Associate Professor in Economics and Head of Research, UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose

Dr. Cecilia Rikap is an Associate Professor in Economics and the Head of Research at the University College London's Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Cecilia's work analyses corporate power and how knowledge extractivism leads to intellectual monopolisation. Her most recent research focuses on artificial intelligence, the cloud, Big Tech dominance, AI-driven geopolitical tensions, digital sovereignty and how digital dependence constrains development. She has published four books on these topics. The award-winning book Capitalism, Power and Innovation: Intellectual Monopoly Capitalism Uncovered and The Digital Innovation Race co-authored the book, and her two most recent books, "Teoría de la Dependencia Digital. Soberanía y Desarrollo en el Capitalismo del Siglo XXI" and "The Rulers: Corporate Power in the Age of AI and the Cloud" both published in 2026.



Rhian Woods,

Partner and Global Head of Analytics, OC&C Strategy Consultants

Rhian Woods is a Partner and Global Head of Analytics at OC&C Strategy Consultants. Over a 28-year career, she has worked at the intersection of customer and commercial strategy, advanced analytics and, increasingly, AI, helping businesses use data and technology to make better commercial decisions and build competitive advantage. Her work spans global, national and regional businesses, with a particular focus on consumer-facing sectors including retail, travel, leisure and consumer goods.



Tony Reeves,
Global Lead, AI in Public Sector, Deloitte LLP


Tony brings over three decades of experience from the front lines of defence and national security to his role as a Partner at Deloitte, where he is Global Lead for AI in Public Sector. His unique perspective, shaped by his time as a British Army Office, government advisor, and Microsoft leader informs his work on helping clients adopt disruptive technologies and ethical AI. He's a challenging voice in the conversation around the future of warfare, advocating for mindset shifts to achieve digital transformation.



Colonel Shaun Lamb MBE (speaking in a personal capacity),
Deputy Head Capability Development, UK Space Command

Colonel Shaun Lamb is Deputy Head Special Projects at UK Space Command. His doctoral research in the University of Southampton's School of Electronics and Computer Science examined how UK Defence intelligence analysts develop trust in AI-enabled decision-support tools, and why such tools are adopted, adapted, or quietly set aside in operational settings.
Shaun joined the British Army in 1993 and has served in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq. He was appointed MBE following his command of the ground-based air defence contribution to the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. His subsequent work has spanned agile command and control, defence intelligence and military space. He developed the concept for a UK space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance constellation and is currently examining how the space domain can contribute to Integrated Air and Missile Defence.
Shaun's interests centre on the responsible adoption of AI in high-consequence organisations, particularly the relationship between technology, human judgement and institutional trust.

About APPG AI



ABOUT

APPGs are informal cross-party groups in the UK Parliament. They are run by and for Members of the Commons and Lords. The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence (APPG AI) functions as the permanent, authoritative voice within the UK Parliament (House of Commons and House of Lords) on all AI-related matters, and it has also become a recognisable forum in the AI policy ecosystem both in the UK and internationally.

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- Dr Allison Gardner MP Labour (APPG AI Co-Chair)
- Alison Griffiths MP Conservative
- Andrew Pakes MP Labour
- Bell Ribeiro-Addy MP Labour
- Ben Lake MP Plaid Cymru
- Chris Kane MP Labour
- Daniel Aldridge MP Labour
- The Rt Hon Damian Hinds MP Conservative
- Dr Danny Chambers MP Liberal Democrat
- Dawn Butler MP Labour (APPG AI Vice-Chair)
- David Reed MP Conservative
- Dave Robertson MP Labour
- The Rt Hon Esther McVey MP Conservative
- Emily Darlington MP Labour
- George Freeman MP Conservative
- Gordon McKee MP Labour
- Graham Leadbitter MP SNP
- Iqbal Mohamed MP Independent
- Juliet Campbell MP Labour
- Leigh Ingham MP Labour
- The Rt Hon Liam Byrne MP Labour
- Sir Mark Hendrick MP Labour
- Martin Wrigley MP Liberal Democrat
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- Sarah Edwards MP Labour
- Tim Roca MP Labour
- Tom Collins MP Labour
- Tom Gorden MP Liberal Democrat
- Tony Vaughan MP Labour
- Zöe Franklin MP Liberal Democrat
- Dr Zubir Ahmed MP Labour

Parliamentary APPG AI Members: House of Lords

- Lord Clement-Jones (Tim Clement-Jones) Liberal Democrat (APPG AI Co-Chair)
- Lord Bilimoria (Karan Faridoon Bilimoria) - Crossbench
- Viscount Colville Of Culross (Charles Mark Townshend Colville) Crossbench
- Lord Craig of Radley (David Brownrigg Craig) Crossbench
- Lord Cromwell (Godfrey Cromwell) Crossbench
- Viscount Camrose (Jonathan William Berry) Conservative
- Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Philip Hunt) Labour
- Lord Janvrin (Robin Berry Janvrin) Crossbench
- Baroness Kramer (Susan Veronica Kramer) Liberal Democrat
- Baroness McGregor-Smith (Ruby McGregor-Smith) Non-affiliated
- Lord McNicol (Iain Mackenzie McNicol) Labour
- Lord Nagaraju (Udaykumar Nagaraju) Labour
- Lord Pitkeathley of Camden Town (Simon Pitkeathley) Labour
- Lord Ranger of Northwood (Kulveer Ranger) Conservative (APPG AI Vice-Chair)
- The Lord Bishop of Oxford (Stephen Croft) Bishops
- Viscount Stansgate (Stephen Stansgate) Labour
- Baroness Thangam Debbonaire (Thangam Elizabeth Rachel Debbonaire) Labour
- Professor Lord Tarassenko (Lionel Tarassenko) Crossbench
- Lord Taylor of Warwick (John David Beckett Taylor) Non-affiliated (APPG AI honorary Vice-Chair)
- Baroness Uddin (Manzila Pola Uddin) Non-affiliated (APPG AI honorary Vice-Chair)

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
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